Abstract
Introduction
Information flow analysis is concerned with statically determining the dependencies between the inputs and the outputs of a program. It allows establishing instances of a non-interference property that may address secrecy and integrity issues.
Although the first pieces of work in this area appear in the late 70's [2] , such an analysis has been formulated as a type system only in the past few years [8, 18, 3, 12] . Types seem to be most suitable for static analysis of information flow. Practically speaking, they may serve as a specification langage, offer automated verification of code -provided type inference is available -and have no run-time cost. From a theoretical point of view, they can express non-interference results in simple and precise ways.
In these systems, types are usually annotated with security levels chosen in a suitable lattice. Each annotation gives an approximation of the information which the expression that it describes may convey. Thus type constructors for (expressions producing) base values -e.g. integers or enumerated constants -carry one security level representing all of the information attached to the value. Such an approximation may be too restrictive in some cases. Indeed, consider the program fragment Ð Ø Ø Ü Ø Ò´ Ý Ø Ò Ð× µ Ð× ´ Þ Ø Ò Ð× µ (Here, the language is equipped with three constants , , belonging to the same datatype.) Ø's value directly depends on the booleans Ü, Ý and Þ. Previous type systems will record this potential information flow by constraining the security level attached to Ø to exceed those of Ü, Ý and Þ.
As a result, they will similarly constrain the level attached to the integer Ù produced by Ð Ø Ù Ø ×
½ ¼ Yet, Ù does not depend on Ý because testing whether Ø's value is rather than or cannot leak any information about Ý.
Our work is a proposal for a more sophisticated analysis (concerning information flow) of sum types. In the previous example, we will attach a (triangular) matrix of three security levels Õ´ ¡ µ, Õ´ ¡ µ and Õ´ ¡ µ to the identifier Ø: one for each (unordered) pair of constructors. Thus Õ´ ¡ µ describes how much information one may leak by testing whether Ø's value is rather than . It must therefore be at least the union of Ü and Ý's levels. Similarly, Õ´ ¡ µ must be the union of Ü and Þ's levels and Õ´ ¡ µ must be Ü's level or greater. In the previous example, because the test allows to determine whether Ø's value is rather than or , our system will approximate the possible information leak by Õ´ ¡ µ Ø Õ´ ¡ µ, i.e. the union of Ü and Þ's levels. Therefore, it will be able to establish the absence of dependency between Ý and Ù.
Recent studies in the area of information flow analysis concern realistic programming languages providing an exception mechanism -such as Java [5] or ML [13] . The treatment of exceptions in these systems seems relatively ad hoc and is not perfectly well understood: although there exists a simple monadic encoding of exceptions into sums [4, 19] , these systems address exceptions in a direct manner. Indeed, both [5] and [13] try to achieve a better precision in the analysis of information flow due to exceptions than existing systems [3] dealing with sums provide.
Because we describe a very accurate type system for sums, we are able to obtain a suitable analysis for exceptions by a simple translation. There are two reasons why this approach is interesting. First, it describes a new analysis of information flow due to exceptions that is more accurate than existing ones. Second, because it may encode existing systems, it allows a better understanding of their design.
Overview
In the current paper, we follow a similar approach to that developed in [13] for Core ML. Section 3 introduces the language · and a technical extension, called ¾ · , that allows us to reason about the simultaneous reduction of two expressions. We present in section 4 the type system and state the non-interference theorem. Then we address the question of type inference in section 5 and present a small set of examples in section 6. Section 7 explains how it is possible to obtain from the type system for sums another one for exceptions by a simple translation of the latter in the former. Lastly, section 8 proposes some restrictions of these systems and relates them to existing work.
By lack of space, some proofs are omitted; they can be found in the full version of this paper [16] .
-calculus with sums
Throughout this paper, every occurence of £ stands for a distinct anonymous meta-variable of appropriate kind.
The · -calculus
Let range over integers; let Ü, range over two disjoint, denumerable sets of program variables and constructor names, respectively. We denote by the set of all constructor names and let range over subsets of . (In the examples, we will assume .) Then, expressions and handlers are defined as follows:
Our language includes the -calculus with pairs and a "let" binding in the style of ML. It is extended with sum expressions built by the construction . For each constructor name , · provides a destructor such that ´ µ evaluates to . A handler is a triple of a subset of , a program variable and an expression. The × construction allows to match an expression's head constructor against a list of handlers:
. (In the following, we will assume that × expressions are deterministic, i.e. that the are pairwise disjoint.) The conjunction of projections and × clauses gives us the expressiveness ofà la ML pattern matching on data constructors. We still provide specific integer constants, although they may be considered as a special case of sums, because they help state non-interference theorems in a concise manner. Lastly, we do not provide any construction allowing recursion; but this can be achieved straightforwardly, for instance by introducing an extra parameter in the construct as in [13] .
The ¾ · calculus
Because establishing a non-interference result requires reasoning about two expressions and exhibiting a bisimulation between their executions, we introduce a technical extension of · . It allows to deal simultaneously with two expressions that share some sub-terms throughout a reduction.
This extension, called ¾ · , is similar to Core ML ¾ in [13] . It is as follows:
We do not allow nesting ¡ ¡ constructs. A ¾ · term represents a pair of · terms. For instance, the ¾ · expression ½ ¾ encodes the pair´ ½ ¾ µ. Because brackets can appear at an arbitrary depth within a ¾ · term, the encoding allows to keep track of sharing: assuming , ½ and ¾ are · expressions, both ½ ¾ and ½ ¾ encode the pair´ ½ ¾ µ, but the former explicitly records the fact that the argument is shared.
In order to relate a ¾ · term to the pair of · expressions which it encodes, we define two projections, ¡ ½ and ¡ ¾ . They are homomorphisms except at ¡ ¡ nodes:
We extend them to handlers by Ü Ü and pointwise to lists of handlers .
The capture-free substitution of Ú for Ü in , written Ü´Ú , is defined in the usual way, except at ¡ ¡ nodes, where we must use an appropriate projection of Ú in each branch: ½ ¾ Ü´Ú is ½ Ü´ Ú ½ ¾ Ü´ Ú ¾ . 
Semantics
The small step operational semantics of ¾ · is given in figure 1 . The semantics of · is obtained as a fragment of that of ¾ · . To clarify the presentation, we divide the set of reduction rules into two groups. Basic reductions are those of · . They perform computation. When read as ¾ · reduction rules, they may be applied outside brackets (in this case, the two projections perfom the same reduction step) or within a bracket context (then one of the two projections remains unchanged). Lifting rules are specific to ¾ · and deal with sharing. They have no computational: they leave both projections unchanged. Their purpose is only to prevent ¡ ¡ constructs from blocking reduction by lifting them up (and thus duplicating some sub-terms).
We choose a call-by-name semantics (we will deal with call-by-value in section 4.6). Thus, evaluation contexts are defined as follows: 
£
We now show that every ¾ · reduction correctly simulates the simultaneous reduction of two · expressions. This is expressed by two lemmas of soundness and correctness. The former states that the projections of a ¾ · reduction are valid · reductions. The latter ensures that if both projections of an expression can produce a normal form then so can the expression. The proof techniques are almost identical to those used in [13] . 
£ 4 Typing
Given two distinct constructors ½ and ¾ , we denote by ½ ¡ ¾ the (unordered) pair ½ ¾ . For any , let ¾ denotes the set of such pairs of elements of .
Is this section, we present a type system tracing information flow in · . This is a ground type system, in so far as it has no type variables. It handles polymorphism in an extensional way: a type scheme is represented by the set of its ground instances. This presentation is very amenable to proofs. Nevertheless, it does not describe a type inference algorithm: we will address this issue in section 5.
The type algebra
Let´Ä µ be a lattice whose elements, denoted by , represent security levels. Types, alternatives, rows and matrices are respectively defined as follows:
A row (resp. a matrix) is an infinite, almost constant family of alternatives (resp. levels) indexed by a subset of (resp. ¾ ), its domain. (A family is almost constant if all but a finite number of its entries are equal.) It is worth noting that because pairs of ¾ are unordered, matrices are in fact triangular. We write´ Öµ for the row whose element at index is and whose other elements are given by the sub-row Ö, which is indexed by Ò . We denote by the row indexed by that maps all its entries to (the domain may be omitted when it can be deduced from the context). Ö represents the row of the same domain as Ö which is equal to Ö on and × elsewhere. Similarly, we write ¾ for the matrix indexed by ¾ that maps all its entries to and Õ denotes the row of the same domain as Õ which is equal to Õ on ¾ and elsewhere. Lastly, Ö Õ µ is a shorthand for Ö ½ Õ½ where Ö ½ Ö and Õ ½ Õ . Given a matrix Õ and a set of constructors , we define
Our types are those of ML's type system (with rows for sum types [14] ) decorated with security annotations that are simple levels and matrices Õ.
The type ÒØ describes integer expressions whose value may reflect information of security level . In many type systems tracing information flow [8, 3, 12, 21, 13 ], arrows carry a security level representing information about the function's identity. Nevertheless, because the only way to observe a function consists in applying it and examining its results, there is really no difference between a function whose identity is secret and a function that produces secret results. As a consequence, following [1], we do not equip the type constructor with an external security level: all the security annotations related to a function may be carried by its result type. Similarly, all of the information carried by a tuple is in fact carried by its components. Thus products have no security annotations.
The main novelty resides in sum types, such as Ö Õ , which consist of a row and a matrix. First, following [14] , the row Ö indicates for every constructor ¾ if the given expression may (ÈÖ Ø) or may not ( ×) produce a value whose head constructor is . The constructor ÈÖ carries, in addition, the type of the constructor's argument. Second, for every pair of constructors ½ ¡ ¾ ¾ ¾ , Õ´ ½ ¡ ¾ µ gives an approximation of the level of information leaked by revealing that the expression produces a value whose head constructor is ½ rather than ¾ , or symmetrically ¾ rather than ½ .
Note that if Ö´ µ ×, none of the levels Õ´ ¡ £ µ carries in practice any relevant information. Thus, the type system would have the same expressiveness if we considered only sum types Ö Õ such that Ö´ µ × implies Õ´ ¡ £ µ . Nevertheless, we prefer not to introduce such a constraint which may needlessly complicate the presentation.
As usual in type systems tracing information flow, we equip the algebra with a subtyping relation that ex- 
Guards
We introduce a two-place predicate ½ Ò È Ø ½ Ø Ò whose first argument is a (finite) list of security levels and whose second argument is a list of types of the same length. We also write Ø ½ Ø Ò Ø as a short-
In practice, we will use constraints of the form Ø will be constrained to be ½ Ø Ø Ò or greater and will record all potential information flows. Because and ¢ types carry no security annotation, rules GUARDS-FUN and GUARDS-PAIR propagate down the constraint on the result's type for and the components types for ¢. This reflects the fact, as explained in section 4.1, that all information about the identity of a function is given by its results and all information carried by a tuple is carried by its components. Lastly, GUARDS-SUM handles sum types.
Its first premise propagates the constraint down. The second one constrains the matrix. If two different branches ½ and ¾ may produce results with different head constructors, namely ½ and ¾ , then any further test that distinguishes these head constructors is liable to leak information of level ½ Ø ¾ . As a result, we constrain the field ½ ¡ ¾ in Õ ½ (resp. Õ ¾ ) to be ½ (resp. ¾ ) or greater. Thus, the same field in Ø must be greater than or equal to ½ Ø ¾ .
Our guards allow keeping more precise information about flows than the simple guards of [13] . To illustrate this point, let us consider the following example:
Because the guard constraint can consider the type of each branch of the × construct in isolation rather than only their union, the type system will be able to take into account the fact that, in this example, only the first (resp. second, third) branch can produce ½ or ¾ (resp. ½ or ¾ , ½ or ¾ ). As a result, the levels associated with the pairs ½ ¡ ¾ , ½ ¡ ¾ and ½ ¡ ¾ are not constrained to be greater than the security levels attached to the identifier Ü (i.e. Õ´ ¡ µ, Õ´ ¡ µ and Õ´ ¡ µ if Ü has type £ Õ .) Using the intermediate result Ø, we now compute an integer Ù:
Therefore the security level of the integer Ù will in particular not be constrained to be greater than Õ´ ¡ µ, reflecting the fact that Ù's value carries no information about whether Ø's head constructor is rather than . 
Lemma 4.2 (Transitivity) If
¼ ½ ½ ¼ Ò Ò and ½ Ò È Ø ½ Ø Ò then ¼ ½ ¼ Ò È Ø ½ Ø Ò holds.× when Ø holds for all Ø ¾ ×.) Types GUARDS-INT ½ ¼ ½ ¡ ¡ ¡ Ò ¼ Ò ½ Ò È ÒØ ¼ ½ ÒØ ¼ Ò GUARDS-FUN ½ Ò È Ø ½ Ø Ò ½ Ò È Ø ¼ ½ Ø ½ Ø ¼ Ò Ø Ò GUARDS-PAIR ½ Ò È Ø ½ Ø Ò ½ Ò È Ø ¼ ½ Ø ¼ Ò ½ Ò È Ø ½ ¢ Ø ¼ ½ Ø Ò ¢ Ø ¼ Ò GUARDS-SUM ½ Ò È Ö ½ Ö Ò ½ ¾ ½ ¾ Ö ½´ ½ µ × Ö ¾´ ¾ µ × µ ½ Õ ½´ ½ ¡ ¾ µ ¾ Õ ¾´ ½ ¡ ¾ µ ½ Ò È Ö ½ Õ½ Ö Ò ÕÒ Rows GUARDS-ALT ½ Ñ È Ø ½ Ø Ñ ½ Ò È × ÈÖ Ø ½ × × ÈÖ Ø Ñ × GUARDS-ROW ¾ ½ Ò È Ö ½´ µ Ö Ò´ µ ½ Ò È Ö ½ Ö Ò
Typing rules
Because the security lattice´Ä µ is arbitrary, our proof technique requires to temporarily split security levels between low and high ones. That's the reason why, in the present section and the next one, we assume fixed À, an upward-closed subset of Ä whose elements will be considered as high security levels. Full generality will be recovered in section 4.6. · 's typing rules are given in figure 4. INT assigns a base type to integer constants, with an unconstrained security level. Because security annotations appear only on sum nodes and leaves in types, rules VAR, ABS, APP, LET, PAIR and PROJ involve no particular constraint and are identical to those of [11] . Polymorphism is allowed by rule LET:
½ can be given a polytype ×. Therefore, by VAR, each occurrence of Ü within ¾ can be typed with a different Ø ¾ ×. Rule E-APP of [13] differs from APP (regardless of the annotations concerning side-effects) by an extra constraint Ø, where is the security annotation of the type constructor. Because the function's result may reveal information about the identity of the function itself, its type Ø must be guarded by . In this paper, potential information about the function's identity is directly propagated to its result type by È. is associated to each handler. It is an approximation of the information leaked by revealing whether the 's head constructor belongs to (i.e. whether will be executed). Then, the last premise computes the union Ø of all Ø guarded by these levels as described in section 4.2.
Rule BRACKET is specific to ¾ · . It allows typing ¡ ¡ constructs by computing the union Ø of the types of the two sub-expressions. Moreover, because brackets enclose secret parts of a computation, they must receive high type, i.e. Ø must be guarded by arbitrary levels chosen in À. 
Type soundness
We first state a few auxiliary lemmas whose proofs are straightforward, then establish the subject reduction theorem. 
Lemma 4.3 (Projection) Let
¾ ½ ¾ . If Ø then Ø.
Non-interference
In the following, the set À is no longer fixed. Thus, it appears as an extra parameter on ¾ · typing judgements (we write À instead of ). It is still unnecessary to mention it on those judgements which involve · expressions because À is used only in the BRACKET rule. reducing the × clause requires ¼ to produce either or (even though it does not affect the final result). Obtaining a strong non-interference statement would require dropping the fine-grained treatment of sums. Anyway, it would be of little sense since we do not deal with timing leaks in general.
Theorem 4.2 (Non-interference)
Because the type system satisfies a progress property (i.e. "no well-typed expression is stuck"), each hypothesis " Ü´ yields an integer" of the non-interference theorem can be safely weakened into " Ü´ does not diverge", i.e. Ü´ Ò , because, by progress, any · normal form of type ÒØ £ must be an integer constant. The non-interference result still applies for 
Type inference
We now explain how a type system with decidable type inference can be obtained from that of section 4. This raises several technical issues. By lack of space we prefer to present it in an informal manner only.
The description of an inference algorithm for a constraint based type system generally consists of two distinct parts: a set of inference rules and a constraint solving algorithm. Obtaining inference rules in the style of HM(X) [17] from a set of rules such as that of figure 4 is a well-studied issue; the reader is referred to [7, 11] for more details. It requires introducing type variables, a constraint language and universally quantified, constrained type schemes. The correctness of the system thus obtained may be proven by a simple encoding of its judgements into · judgements. This set of rules may be viewed as an algorithm which, given an input expression, returns a constraint which is satisfiable if and only if the expression is well typed.
Constraint solving for (non-atomic) subtyping is known to be decidable and reasonably efficient algorithms have been proposed in this area [9, 10] . However, our system involves non-standard forms of constraints. We claim that constraint solving remains a decidable problem.
Constraints of the form Ö can be encoded using simple subtyping constraints requiring fields not in to be ×. In CASE's premises, typing judgements concerning the handlers are subject to a condition of the form Ö . Such a condition may be enforced in the type inference system by prefixing with it every constraint produced by the judgement. This introduces conditional constraints such aś Ö µ where is an arbitrary constraint. Such a constraint may be solved by keeping it unchanged as long as none of Ö's fields corresponding to constructors in are known to be ÈÖ £. When one of them is unified with ÈÖ £ then the condition is satisfied and the conditional´Ö µ must be replaced by itself. If the number of constructor names that are present in every sum type is finite and statically known (e.g. if sum type are used to represent finite variant types such as ML's datatypes), such a constraint may be decomposed pointwise by generating a different conditional constraint for each pair of constructors ½ ¡ ¾ . Otherwise, it may be viewed as a conditional constraint involving two-dimensional rows:
ÈÖ £ ÈÖ £µ ´Ö ½ Ö ¾ µ µ ½ Õ ½ . Although twodimensional rows have never been -to the best of our knowledge -really used, they form a natural generalization of rows [15] and can be manipulated using the same techniques [10] .
Lastly, constraints of the form Õ´ µ are equivalent to
. Once again, if the number of involved constructor names is finite, this constraint may be decomposed pointwise into a number of inequalities between security levels. Otherwise, it may be viewed as a subtyping constraint between two- 
Õ
¼ is the restriction of Õ to the rectangle ¢´ Ò µ. Assuming is finite or cofinite, this restriction may be computed thanks to unification constraints using Rémy's row syntax [14] .
Examples
In this section, we illustrate the expressiveness of · 's type system by describing the types obtained for a small set of relevant examples. We use a Caml-like syntax, which can be easily de-sugared into · . In particular, we allow constructors with no argument and booleans. Booleans can be easily encoded within sums by choosing two different constructors Ì and (for the constants true and false, respectively). The test Lastly our system detects the absence of information flow from the second argument to the output of , the composition of and , as reflected by its types: « ¬ AE «ØAE . The function ¼ is identical to the function but it returns its result embedded in a -abstraction:
This example illustrates the interest of the absence of security level on the type constructor: it allows the accuracy of the typing of sums to pass through it. As a result, if we re-implement by let f x y z = (f' x y z) 0, we obtain exactly the same type scheme as that for the first version.
Our next example tests whether the head constructor of its argument is or not: It admits Ö Õ Õ´ µ (for every Õ) as type: the resulting boolean is marked with the union of all security levels attached to the constructor in the input.
The ÖÓØ Ø function performs a transposition of three constructors:
The same transposition arises between the corresponding fields of the types describing the input and the output of this function:´ « ¬ AE ×µ´
Because our type system guards the type of each branch of the × clause before computing the type of the whole expression, it is able to exactly relate in this example the security levels associated with each pair of constructors of the output with those of the input.
-calculus with exceptions

The -calculus
In this section, we define a -calculus with "let" binding and exceptions, . Let be a denumerable set whose elements are called exception names and denoted by . Then values, outcomes, expressions and evaluation contexts of are defined as follows:
is the language studied in [13] (where it is referred to as "Core ML") deprived of the constructions dealing with references. Its small-step semantics is recalled in figure 5 . (Ó escapes if and only if Ó cannot be reduced by one of the rules (bind), (handle) and (handle-all)).
Because of the presence of effects, our presentation of differs from that of · in two points. First, following [20] , it is restricted to a call-by-value setting to preserve confluence. Second, we introduce a segregation between values and expressions. This syntactic restriction enables a lighter formulation of the type system and allows it to remain independent of the evaluation order. It does not reduce the expressiveness of the language because usual expressions may be encoded into our restricted syntax in a straightforward manner (see [13] , section 5.7).
Encoding into
CBV
·
Let the constructors of · be exactly the exception names of , with an additional one, denoted by (i.e. ). The basic idea of the encoding introduced by figure 6 is to translate every expression of into an expression Â Ã of · such that if evaluates to a value Ú without raising an exception then Â Ã evaluates to ÄÚÅ in CBV · and if the execution of raises an exception Ú then Â Ã reduces to ÄÚÅ. Such an encoding may be defined in a systematic way using monads [4, 19] , but here we prefer, for simplicity, a direct translation. It is stable w.r.t. substitution in the sense that Â Ü Ú Ã Â Ã Ü´ÄÚÅ . The following lemmas establish the correctness of the encoding with respect to the semantics.
Lemma 7.1 (Correctness) If
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ¼ . Figure 6 . Encoding into · AE Cases (handle), (handle-all) and (throw-context) are similar to (bind).
Proof. By induction on the definition of Ä¡Å and Â¡Ã. £
Typing
We now define a type system for and prove its correctness by translating each judgement into a · one. The type algebra for is a simple subset of that of · . Restricted types, alternatives, rows and matrices (denoted by bold meta-variables) are defined as follows:
The meta-variable Ö (resp. Õ) stands for a row Ö (resp. matrix Õ) carrying no information about , i.e. such that Ö´ µ × (resp. ¾ Õ´ ¡ µ ). Types for integers and pairs remain unchanged. In this restriction, · sum types play two distinct roles. First they appear as effects on the right-hand-side of function types. Here, they describe the possible normal or exceptional results the function may produce, with associated security levels. Second, they are used to type expressions whose result is an exception: Ö Õ .
There, we use dotted versions of content and level rows to signify that the fields relating to the constructor may be constrained to be × and , respectively (the translation of an exception value into · is a sum whose head constructor must belong to ).
's polytypes (i.e. nonempty upwardclosed sets of types Ø) are denoted by the meta-variable ×.
The typing rules for are given in figure 7 . We distinguish two forms of judgements: The following lemma states the soundness of this type system by considering each of its judgements as one of · .
Lemma 7.3 (Soundness)
From this correspondence, we immediately obtain the following non-interference result for . For simplicity, the statement only concerns integer results, but a more general one can be obtained. 
The system ´½µ ·
In this section, we present a more lightweight type system for · (which we will refer to as ´½µ · ) where information carried by a sum is described by a one-dimensional row of levels indexed by constructor names. We begin by restricting the × construction of · to have only two handlers:
(Note that such a restriction still allows multiple matching by nesting × clauses. Moreover, it still allows the encoding of exceptions into sums, see section 8.2.)
The point of this restriction is that the use of matrices Õ in the CASE rule of · is now limited to an access of the form Õ´ µ for some ¾ (or Õ´ Ò µ which is equal to Õ´ µ). The basic idea of ´½µ · consists in directly storing these levels in sum types, rather than the whole matrix Õ. 
The system
´½µ Using the same mechanism, it is possible to obtain the corresponding type system ´½µ for . Those of its rules that are different from 's are given in figure 10 . ´½µ provides a treatment of exceptions that is very similar to that of JFlow [6, 5] , although the presentation is superficially different. Indeed, JFlow introduces a notion of path labels. Setting aside Java-specific features, paths in JFlow are Ò (which represents normal termination) and names of classes that inherit from Ì ÖÓÛ Ð , i.e. classes representing exceptions. This directly corresponds in our framework to and the exception names ¾ , respectively. A path label maps each path × to either the special constant , if the expression cannot terminate through the path ×, or a security level approximating how much information will be obtained by observing that this path is the effective termination path. This is comparable to our alternatives × and ÈÖ . The accuracy provided by the constraint when all fields but one of a row are × is obtained in JFlow by a non-syntax-directed rule, called single-path rule, allowing Ò to be reset to if all other paths are already mapped to by . (Because exception names are classes in Java and are therefore equipped with subtyping, this rule cannot be applied safely to non-Ò paths. But, as noticed by Myers, if exceptions were not identified with classes, the single-path rule could be applied to exceptions too.)
If we constrain the field of every row Ö of ´½µ to be ÈÖ £, we obtain a treatment of exceptions similar to that proposed in [13] . Then, every lower-bound constraint on the entry of a row Õ (generated by a constraint) must also constrain some other field of the same row. As a result, it is possible to enforce the invariant that, for any row Õ, Õ´ µ Ø Õ´ µ ¾ . The main interest of this policy lies in the fact that, because ´ ÈÖ Ø Öµ Õ becomes equivalent to Ø ´ Ö´ µ × µ Õ´ µµ, the system requires only a very simple form of conditional constraints.
Conclusion
It is an interesting question in what context this analysis would be useful. Because of the structure of security annotations involving matrices of levels, a type inference algorithm based on our framework is likely to produce very verbose type schemes. That is the reason why it seems difficult to use it as the basis for a generic secure programming language, as we aim at with MLIF [13] . Nevertheless such an implementation might be of interest for automated analysis of very sensitive (relatively to information flow) part of programs for which systems such as [5, 13] remain too approximative. Such a case may particularly arise in programming languages for devices with limited ressources, such as JavaCard, where integer constants are used as flags in order to represent different data in an unstructured manner.
Moreover, it seems possible to design a reasonably efficient algorithm addressing type inference and constraint solving for this system: we believe that this is mainly an implementation and proof issue.
Another topic of interest lies in adding mutable cells (a.k.a. references) to · and . Obtaining a treatment of references similar to that of [13] (where reference types Ø Ö have an invariant argument Ø describing the content of the cell and carry an external security annotation related to the reference's identity) is straightforward. This remains an orthogonal problem to the accurate treatment of union types. It mainly requires adding an extra security annotation Ô on every typing judgement and on types. Nevertheless, such a framework does not provide as fine-grained a treatment of information flow generated by side-effects as that for functional aspects of the language. Then, the system would no longer be able to detect the absence of dependency between Ù and the value stored in Ø because in all the branches of this program the content of the cell Ø must have the same type (i.e.´ ÈÖ £µ Õ ). Therefore, the three security levels of the matrix Õ will be constrained to exceed that of Ü, Ý and Þ. Thus, an interesting direction for further work consists in obtaining a finegrained analysis of dependencies due to side-effects.
